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Decisional Integrity and the Business
Judgment Rule: A Theory
Alfred Dennis Mathewson*
I. INTRODUCTION
Shareholders associate together to own a business enterprise in
corporate form. The nature of this association requires that an indi-
vidual shareholder accept less than exclusive control over the enter-
prise and live with some form of collective decision making. In fact,
corporate law divests shareholders of direct decision-making power
and, instead, vests it in a board of directors elected by shareholders.
Despite this divestiture, shareholders voluntarily step into these as-
sociations in the hope of obtaining a share in the enterprise's profits.
Making a profit necessarily requires the board of directors to take
some risks. Thus, shareholders must expect that directors, to whom
decision-making authority has been delegated, will take risks in the
pursuit of profits and that some activities undertaken will fail.' The
expectation that some pursuits will fail, combined with the
mandatory delegation of decision-making authority, often leads to
dissention among the investors regarding the particular risks under-
taken and disappointment in the profit on their returns. Corporate
law generally permits these dissenting and disappointed shareholders
to sell their shares, or to attempt to influence the election of direc-
tors whom they believe would do a better job or implement accepta-
ble policies. However, such recourse may be time-consuming, costly,
and frequently unprofitable. Accordingly, many shareholders seek
judicial redress as a remedy. The courts, leery of this drain on judi-
cial resources where investors have voluntarily associated together
for profit, and concerned about cumbersome decision-making devices,
have developed rules to reduce the number of such cases that courts
will hear.
* Professor of Law, University of New Mexico.
1. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 885 (2d Cir. 1982), cert. denied sub. nom. Citytrust
v. Joy, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
The principal doctrine embodying this reluctance is known as the
business judgment rule. Most articulations of the business judgment
rule start with its use as a "defense of director" action, since the ini-
tial application of the rule was to protect directors from liability.2
Yet, the roots of the rule lie in the grant of primary decision-making
authority to directors. Modern courts and commentators view the
business judgment rule as a logical derivative of the common statu-
tory lodging of the board of directors' authority to direct the control
and management of the corporation. 3 The statutes contemplate that
all powers so granted will be exercised by the directors in their busi-
ness judgment.4 Many judicial opinions simply restate the proposi-
tion that the particular matter or action was within the business
judgment of the directors.
However, the rule is more commonly known for its use as a de-
fense of director action. It is generally considered to be a shield be-
hind which a director may make and act on decisions without the
threat of personal liability. There are several versions of the rule,
each articulated as some form of judicial nonintervention. In gen-
eral, the business judgment rule defense creates a rebuttable pre-
sumption that directors acted in good faith and fulfilled their
fiduciary duty of care, despite the fact that some business decisions
went awry.5 The courts, presuming the exercise of business judg-
ment unless shown otherwise, will not second-guess the decisions of
corporate directors. The essence of the rule is captured in cases like
Shlensky v. Wrigley.6 In Shienaky, an Illinois court applied the busi-
ness judgment rule and declined to reverse the decision of directors
of a professional baseball club not to install lights in its ballpark,
even though the organization was the only club which had not done
so and was therefore losing money.7
The rule has engendered much litigation and considerable schol-
2. See Arsht, The Business Judgment Rule Revisited, 8 HoFSTRA L. REV. 93, 97-
100 (1979).
3. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 872 (Del. 1985); see also Arsht, supra note
2, at 97-100.
4. See, e.g., MODEL BusiNEss CORP. AcT § 8.30(a) (Supp. 1989), which states:
(a) A director shall discharge his duties as a director, including his duties as a
member of a committee:
(1) in good faith;
(2) with the care an ordinary prudent person in a like position would ex-
ercise under similar circumstances; and
(3) in a manner he reasonably believes to be in the best interests of the
corporation.
Id.
5. Steinberg, Some Thoughts on Regulation of Tender Offers, 43 MD. L. REV. 240,
242 (1984).
6. 95 Ill. App. 2d 173, 237 N.E.2d 776 (1968).
7. Id. at 183, 237 N.E.2d at 781 (an "absence of a clear showing of a dereliction of
duty on the part of the specific directors" found).
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arly commentary. The continuing interest in the rule largely results
from judicial attempts to balance the tension between the need for
accountability on the part of directors and concern about unwieldy
decision-making, adverse effects of the alacrity of qualified directors
to serve on boards of directors, and the drain on judicial resources.
The mere existence of this balancing highlights a rarely spoken and
often overlooked truth: courts have always been willing to scrutinize
director action to some extent, lest directors escape all accountability.
Where a decision is tainted by a conflict of interest, director action is
subject to exacting scrutiny. Courts will second-guess the merits of
such tainted action taken by directors and evaluate its soundness
under the intrinsic fairness standard. Illegal or fraudulent actions
are also subject to judicial scrutiny.8 Although decisions such as Lit-
win v. Allen 9 have been frequently criticized,10 courts have also sec-
ond-guessed the merits of decisions of the directors of financial
institutions.
The court in Litwin evaluated a substantive decision of the board
and found it so flawed that it amounted to a breach of the directors'
duty of care." Until Smith v. Van Gorkom,12 the corporate bar ac-
cepted the Litwin result as an aberration uniquely applicable to fi-
nancial institutions.13 In Van Gorkom, the board of directors'
decision to approve a cashout merger was held as an uninformed
business decision, due to the absence of board knowledge of certain
pertinent facts which would have made the decision a properly in-
formed one.' 4 Although the result in Van Gorkom also appeared to
evaluate the substantive decision of the directors, many commenta-
tors1 5 and lawyers' 6 have concluded that Van Gorkom emphasized a
point inherent in the duty of care analysis, namely that courts will
scrutinize the process by which decisions were made. Under this
8. Id. at 181, 237 N.E.2d at 780. The courts "should not interfere" with board de-
cisions unless there are allegations of "fraud, illegality or conflict of interests." Id.
9. 25 N.Y.S.2d 667 (Sup. Ct. 1940).
10. See R. CLARK, CORPORATE LAW § 3.4 (1986).
11. Litwin, 25 N.Y.S.2d at 737.
12. 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
13. W. CARY & M. EISENBERG, CORPORATIONS 516-17 (6th ed. unabr. 1988); Bishop,
Sitting Ducks and Decoy Ducks: New Trends in the Indemnification of Corporate Di-
rectors and Officers, 77 YALE L.J. 1078, 1095-99 (1968).
14. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 874.
15. See, e.g., Fischel, The Business Judgment Rule and the Trans Union Case, 40
Bus. LAW. 1437 (1985).
16. Cheek, Making Ordinary Board of Directors' Decisions, 12 ALI-ABA COURSE
MATERIAL J. 65 (1988); Manning, Reflections and Practical Tips on Life in the Boar-
droom After Van Gorkom, 41 Bus. LAW. 1 (1985).
view, Van Gorkom does not mean that courts will subject the merits
of director decisions to scrutiny. Yet, the Van Gorkom court could
not have awarded a remedy to the complaining shareholders unless it
found that they had been harmed by the deficient process. It could
have determined the existence of harm only by second-guessing the
decision of the directors.
The connection between the process used by the directors in Van
Gorkom and the merits of the decision reached or action taken serves
as the catalyst for this article. Van Gorkom illustrates that the mere
necessity of ascertaining the extent of injury means that courts will
also second-guess the merits of decisions made by directors where the
decision has been made through a deficient process. The traditional
and familiar model of judicial nonintervention rests on the converse
of this connection. As a general proposition, if the process used by
the board is not deficient, then courts will not engage in evaluation of
the substantive decision or action. No matter which side of this con-
nection is viewed, the degree of judicial review of director action ap-
pears to be a function of the need for integrity in decision-making
processes.
If this observation is correct, then several questions abound. What
is adequate process? Those readers familiar with constitutional law
precepts may recognize this question as: How much process is due?
Is adequate process always the same or does it vary with the circum-
stances? What are the standards for merit evaluation of substantive
decisions? This article further contends that the answers to these
questions start with the importance of the integrity of decision-mak-
ing processes to corporate management. The inherent disputes
among shareholders in the normative model of corporate governance
make it a catalyst for litigation. The use of high integrity decision-
making processes may result in better decisions and actions, and
thereby abate the catalytic powers of normative governance. Alter-
natively, they may produce greater respect for decisions and actions
on the part of disappointed and dissenting shareholders and generate
investor confidence in the corporate system.
Historically, director decision-making has been analyzed doctri-
nally according to specific fiduciary duties. Under these analyses, di-
rector decision-making falls generally into two discrete categories:
decision-making that must be examined under the duty of care or the
duty of loyalty. Decision-making, however, includes both the deci-
sions and the processes by which the decision is made. This article
argues that the decision and process components are not monolithic.
Instead, each respectively encompasses a spectrum of various types of
decisions or processes. At one end of the decision spectrum are deci-
sions on matters likely to be reached under ordinary circumstances
[Vol. 17: 879, 1990] Decisional Integrity
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through the exercise of business judgment. At the other end are de-
cisions on conflict of interest transactions between influential insid-
ers17 and the corporation.1 8 This article refers to the class of
decisions in the first instance as ordinary matters and in the latter
instance as self-dealing.
The process spectrum parallels the decision spectrum. The process
spectrum ranges from the inclusion of shareholders and disinterested
directors, fairness constraints on substantive decisions, and actions in
the case of self-dealing, to discretionary process without substantive
decision constraints in the case of ordinary matters. The two spectra
work together so that the specific measures necessary to assure integ-
rity of process vary, based upon the nature of the decision or action
taken by directors. The fiduciary duties of care and loyalty provide
the principal doctrinal structure for these spectra.
Part II of this article describes the decision spectrum from deci-
sions on ordinary matters to decisions of self-dealing. The area of the
spectrum between the ends consists of decisions on matters possess-
ing varying degrees of the characteristics of both polar categories.
The intermediate area includes takeover defenses, reactions to deriv-
ative suits, and fundamental change transactions.' 9 Such decisions
may be classified as mixed motive decisions, and may be recognized
by the degree of potential dominance by the inherent conflicts of in-
terests among collaborators in the corporate enterprise over business
judgment.2 0 In this article, inherent conflicts of interest among col-
laborators other than those relating to self-dealing are referred to as
intercollaborator conflicts.
Part III describes the spectrum of decision-making processes which
correspond to their counterparts in the decision spectrum. Self-deal-
ing, constituting the most dangerous form of conflict, requires greater
17. Dean Clark refers to transactions between "influential insiders" rather than
merely directors or officers. Influential insiders are persons who have "decision mak-
ing influence with respect to the actions taken by" the corporation. R. CLARK, supra
note 10, at § 4.1 (emphasis omitted).
18. See Palmiter, Reshaping the Corporate Fiduciary Model" A Director's Duty of
Independence, 67 TEx. L. REV. 1351, 1353 (1989) (recognizing three categories of deci-
sions: (1) those measured by the duty of care; (2) those measured by the duty of loy-
alty; and (3) those involving mixed motives).
19. See infra notes 57-59 and accompanying text. Professors Macey and Miller, in
an analysis of Van Gorkom, argued that takeovers constitute a category of transactions
separate and distinct from traditional business judgment rule cases. Macey & Miller,
Trans Union Reconsidered, 98 YALE L.J. 127, 128 (1988); cf. Chappenelli, Trans Union
Unreconsidered, 15 J. CoRP. L. 27 (1989).
20. See Palmiter, supra note 18, 1353-54.
measures to assure integrity in decision-making. Decisions on ordi-
nary matters require less formal measures to assure integrity. Deci-
sions in the intermediate class require stronger measures than those
needed for ordinary matters to assure integrity, but perhaps less
stringent measures than those needed in the case of entity conflicts.
However, the intermediate class of decisions is quite broad, and the
level of danger from intercollaborator conflicts varies from decision
to decision. The courts, confronted with intermediate class decisions,
have required the use of processes with features specifically designed
to reduce the influence of intercollaborator conflicts. These include
the conducting of a reasonable investigation, the use of experts, reli-
ance on independent and disinterested directors, disclosure to share-
holders, and substantive constraints on decisions. In addition, some
intermediate class decisions, such as fundamental change transac-
tions, require the utilization of processes expressly mandated by stat-
ute.21  This article contends that these additional process
requirements pressure boards of directors to assure shareholders and
the courts that the board reached its decision in the exercise of busi-
ness judgment.
By far, the most controversial measures adopted by the courts to
assure decisional integrity have been the imposition of substantive
constraints. Part IV analyzes the relationship between substantive
constraints and decisional integrity, and argues that courts resort to
substantive standards in an effort to cloak controversial corporate de-
cisions with the integrity of the judicial decision-making process.
This article concludes that courts will attempt to impose substantive
constraints whenever they perceive that a decision was unduly influ-
enced by intercollaborator conflicts, notwithstanding the use of ac-
ceptable process, or a deficient decision-making process used by
directors. This article further concludes that, while it is not possible
for the courts to craft perfect substantive constraints, they will not be
deterred from attempting to do so merely because the task is
difficult.
II. THE DECISION SPECTRUM
Many articulations of the business judgment rule defense present a
spectrum of board decisions. Attorney Samuel Arsht states that the
defense is applicable only where "[a] corporate transaction . . .in-
volves no self-dealing by, or other personal interest of, the directors
who authorized the transaction."22 The defense is not available to
protect all types of board decisions or actions; yet, the gamut does not
run from the ordinary to the extraordinary. Instead, Arsht, as have
21. See infra note 57.
22. Arsht, supra note 2, at 111 (footnote omitted).
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most courts and commentators, recognizes conflicts of interests, or
the absence thereof, as the distinguishing characteristic of director
decisions and actions that are protected by the business judgment
rule defense. His formulation, however, suggests three broad classes
of decisions or actions: those involving self-dealing, those otherwise
tainted by the personal interests of directors, and those to which the
business judgment rule defense is applicable.
Distinctions among board decisions also appear in cases such as
Sinclair Oil v. Levien.23 In Sinclair, minority shareholders chal-
lenged a dividend policy, a strategic business plan, and the perform-
ance of contractual obligations owed to the corporation by its parent.
The court indicated that the degree of its review would depend upon
the nature of the transactions or policies approved by the board.24 It
then analyzed each of the three board actions to determine the de-
gree of judicial scrutiny appropriate for each. The court stated that
dividend declarations qualified as a decision to which the business
judgment rule defense applied, unless the plaintiffs demonstrated
self-dealing, the absence of any reasonable business objective, or im-
proper motives. 25 The strategic business plan, which prevented the
corporation from operating or developing opportunities outside of
Venezuela, also qualified as a decision under the business judgment
rule defense, unless the plaintiffs showed self-dealing or gross over-
reaching.26 However, the parent corporation's failure to make timely
payments and purchase minimum quantities of crude oil and refined
product constituted self-dealing. 7
The Arsht and Sinclair analyses of the business judgment rule de-
23. 280 A.2d 717 (Del. 1971).
24. The court stated that the intrinsic fairness standard does not apply solely by
virtue of the relationship between the parent corporation and the subsidiary. The
standard is applicable only in situations involving self-dealing. Id at 720. See also
Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W.2d 668 (1919), in which the Michigan
Supreme Court distinguished between dividend policy and a socialistic strategic busi-
ness plan.
25. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 722.
26. The corporation argued that the business judgment rule defense applied unless
the plaintiff demonstrated gross and palpable overreaching. The court did not mention
this standard in its analysis of the dividend policy, other than to restate the corpora-
tion's argument. It did, however, articulate its application to the strategic business
plan. "Accordingly, Sinclair's decision, absent fraud or gross overreaching, to achieve
expansion through the medium of its subsidiaries, other than Sinven, must be upheld."
Id The court may have resorted to this version of the business judgment rule defense
because it was not confronted with a specific transaction to which it could apply its
self-dealing test.
27. Id at 723.
fense evince a spectrum of director decisions or actions, rather than
discrete classifications. Decisions or actions involving self-dealing are
at one end and those qualifying for the business judgment rule de-
fense are at the other. Accordingly, the middle includes a wide array
of transactions. These intermediate decisions and actions involve the
personal interests of directors under the Arsht description28 and im-
proper motives under the Sinclair analysis.29
A. Decisions Involving Self-Dealing
The decision spectrum is comprised of decisions or actions that
vary based on the degree and character of any conflicts of interest
within their composition, with matters of self-dealing representing
one pole of the spectrum. In Sinclair, the Delaware Supreme Court
distinguished self-dealing from other conflicts of interest transactions
by adding the provision that the parent company must receive some
benefit "to the exclusion of, and detriment to, the minority stock-
holders of the subsidiary." 30 Even though the court focused on the
exclusion of minority shareholders, the essence of self-dealing in-
volved corporate injury-the taking of something that rightfully be-
longs to the corporation.
The exclusionary benefit provision was necessary because the rela-
tionship between a parent corporation and its subsidiary, which has
minority shareholders, exacerbates intercollaborator conflicts. These
conflicts of interest naturally exist among those economic actors
seeking to further their own self-interest in their collaboration with
others. Collaboration does not mean that interests are always
aligned. The interests of controlling shareholders vary from those of
minority shareholders,31 while the interests of preferred sharehold-
ers vary from the interests of common shareholders. 32 The interests
of directors and officers vary from that of shareholders, especially
with executive compensation,3 3 defensive maneuvers against hostile
takeovers,34 and proxy fights.3 5
However, none of these participants would agree to collaborate un-
less they could further their self-interest. These intercollaborator
conflicts of interests are present in the self-dealing context where a
director is disloyal to the corporation. Moreover, these intercol-
28. See Arsht, supra note 2, at 111.
29. See Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 722.
30. 1& at 720.
31. Dodge v. Ford Motor Co., 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
32. Wabash Ry. Co. v. Barclay, 280 U.S. 197 (1930)..
33. Gaillard v. Natomas Co., 208 Cal. App. 3d 1250, 256 Cal. Rptr. 702 (1989);
Pogostin v. Rice, 480 A.2d 619 (Del. 1984); Michelson v. Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del.
1979); Newton v. Hornbolower, Inc., 224 Kan. 506, 582 P.2d 1136 (1978).
34. Cheff v. Mathes, 41 Del. Ch. 494, 199 A.2d 548 (1964).
35. Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus., 285 A.2d 430 (Del. Ch. 1971)
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laborator conflicts of interests will exist no matter what the corpora-
tion does, and no matter what action or decision comes before the
board of directors. If the courts subjected all board action that in-
volved intercollaborator conflicts of interests to exacting scrutiny, the
courts would replace boards of directors as the chief decision-making
bodies for corporations. Thus, the Sinclair court used the exclusion-
ary benefit provision as a benchmark for ascertaining whether the in-
tercollaborator conflict of interest resulted in conduct that
transformed its character into self-dealing. 36
Unless that transformation occurs, director actions and decisions
fall into the intermediate category or the business judgment defense
category. The analysis of the dividend declarations in Sinclair illus-
trates this point. The Delaware Supreme Court indicated that the
declaration would most likely be protected by the business judgment
rule defense if it did not constitute self-dealing. 37 However, it also in-
dicated that the declaration might under some circumstances consti-
tute an action tainted by improper motives.38 Dividend declarations
of the latter type would not be categorized under the business judg-
ment defense, nor would it be evaluated under the intrinsic fairness
standard.39 Instead, such declarations would be valid unless they
were not grounded on a reasonable business objective or they
amounted to waste.40
36. The Sinclair definition is under-inclusive. It includes only those transactions
in which an interested insider obtains a benefit not shared with other shareholders.
However, many corporate statutes literally apply to any transaction between a director
and the corporation. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1984). Dean Clark largely
follows the statutory approach and would treat any transaction between the corpora-
tion and influential insiders as self-dealing. Clark, supra note 10, at § 4.1. The legal
consequence of self-dealing, thus, is an issue separable from that of whether conduct
constitutes self-dealing. This article uses the term as it is defined in Sinclair.
37. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 721-22.
38. Id. at 722.
39. This argument is based on two separate statements of the Sinclair court. The
court first stated that compliance with statutory procedures and authority would "not,
under all circumstances, justify all dividend payments. If . .. a dividend cannot be
grounded on any reasonable business objective, then the courts can and will interfere
with the board's decision to pay the dividend." Id, at 721. Implicit in its discussion of
self-dealing is the conclusion that the courts would apply the intrinsic fairness stan-
dard only when the declaration amounted to self-dealing. That is, the directors or con-
trolling shareholders received a benefit not shared with minority shareholders.
However, the court's statement on judicial intervention does not limit it to only those
dividends that constitute self-dealing. This point is confirmed by the statement that
"[t]he motives for causing the declaration of dividends are immaterial unless the plain-
tiff can show that the dividend payments resulted from improper motives and
amounted to waste." Id at 722.
40. Id.
B. Decisions on Ordinary Matters
The other pole of the decision spectrum is generally limited to or-
dinary matters. Decisions on ordinary matters normally will be
reached through the exercise of business judgment, even in the ab-
sence of strict process safeguards. Examples of ordinary matters in-
clude establishing the general direction and basic business policies of
the corporation, as well as implementing and monitoring these direc-
tives and policies.4 ' Also included are the determination of when to
declare a dividend and how much of a dividend should be paid;42 the
hiring and firing of senior officers;43 the holding of corporate elec-
tions and the dissemination of relevant information to sharehold-
ers;44 and the determination of whether to bring legal action.45
The presumption that director decisions are generally the product
of business judgment creates a procedural obstacle which renders the
class of decisions under the business judgment defense broader than
the class of decisions under ordinary matters. All director decisions
will be protected by the business judgment rule defense unless a
complaining shareholder alleges circumstances which indicate that
the directors reached a decision influenced by something other than
their business judgment. Mere conclusory allegations of the im-
proper influence of an intercollaborator conflict generally will not
suffice.46 However, Sinclair implied that a transaction between a
parent and its subsidiary constitutes a circumstance which suggests
that directors were influenced by something other than their busi-
ness judgment in taking action or making decisions.47 Under Sin-
clair, courts should first examine allegations of transactions between
parent and subsidiary corporations for self-dealing.48 Sinclair also
indicates that allegations that are not legally sufficient to show that a
board's action or decision amounts to self-dealing, improper motives,
41. See, e.g., MODEL BUSINESS CORP. AcT § 8.01(b) (Supp. 1989). The Act provides
that "[a]ll corporate powers shall be exercised by or under the authority of, and the
business and affairs of the Corporation managed under the direction of, its board of
directors .... Id. (emphasis added); see also Cheek, supra note 16, at 66-69.
42. In re Carlisle's Will, 53 Misc. 2d 546, 553, 278 N.Y.S.2d 1011, 1018 (1967).
43. Pardue v. Citizens Bank & Trust Co., 287 Ala. 50, 247 So.2d 368 (1971).
44. Eisenberg, Access to the Corporate Proxy Machinery, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1489
(1970).
45. McKee v. Rogers, 18 Del. Ch. 81, 156 A.2d 191 (1931); see also Starrels v. First
Nat'l Bank, 870 F.2d 1168, 1173-74 (7th Cir. 1989) (Easterbrook, J., concurring).
46. See, e.g., Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 815 (Del. 1984) (conclusory allega-
tions that the owner of 47% of the stock of corporation dominated the directors were
insufficient; plaintiff should have alleged specific facts that created a reasonable doubt
that directors are disinterested and independent or that the transaction was not the
product of business judgment); see also Grobow v. Perot, 539 A.2d 180 (Del. 1988).
47. Sinclair Oil v. Levien, 280 A.2d 717, 720 (1971).
48. If the allegations do not reflect self-dealing, then the transaction falls within
the category of actions or decisions under the business judgment rule defense, unless
the complainant advances sufficient allegations to indicate otherwise. Id.
[Vol. 17: 879, 1990] Decisional Integrity
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or waste should be protected by the business judgment rule de-
fense.49 Procedural rules thus establish the business judgment rule
defense as a default rule which covers all board decisions unless a
complaining shareholder pushes the right procedural buttons.
C. Decisions in the Intermediate Class
Decisions in the intermediate class may be described as those in
which the influence of intercollaborator conflicts looms large. Com-
paring the contrasting treatment of dividend decisions in the histori-
cal case of Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.50 and Sinclair provides a picture
of the intermediate class decisions. In Ford Motor, the Michigan
Supreme Court reviewed a decision by Ford Motor Company to pay
only modest dividends, notwithstanding recent substantial profits.
Henry Ford was the controlling shareholder, and the Dodge brothers,
who needed financing for a rival company, were minority sharehold-
ers. Under those circumstances, the court evaluated the propriety of
the dividend policy by measuring it against this unspoken standard:
Are profits in excess of the reasonable needs of the business?51
The court in Ford Motor subjected a dividend policy to substantive
constraints, while the Sinclair court utilized the business judgment
rule defense. The distinction between the tests suggests that the
character of decisions on dividend policy may vary. Sinclair appar-
ently considered the dividend policy to be an ordinary matter,52 while
the court in Ford Motor thought the dividend policy deviated from an
ordinary board decision. 53 The distinction between the circumstances
surrounding the dividend policy in Ford Motor and those in Sinclair
suggest that the chief characteristic of intermediate class decisions
lies in the degree to which an intercollaborator conflict of interest in-
fluences a particular action or decision.
Much of the confusion surrounding the scope and proper applica-
tion of the business judgment rule defense arises out of intermediate
class decisions, although intercollaborator conflicts can also be pres-
ent in decisions involving ordinary matters. Intermediate class deci-
sions differ from decisions on ordinary matters in that the
intercollaborator conflicts are central to the particular action taken
or decision made. An ordinary matter may affect shareholders differ-
49. Id at 722.
50. 204 Mich. 459, 170 N.W. 668 (1919).
51. 1d. at 509-10, 170 N.W. at 685.
52. Sinclair, 280 A.2d at 720-22.
53. Ford Motor, 204 Mich. at 503, 170 N.W. at 683.
ently, as, for example, the payment of exorbitant dividends as a
source of financing for the parent corporation in Sinclair. An inter-
mediate class decision may not only affect shareholders differently, it
may be designed to treat them differently, as shown in Dalton v.
American Investment Co.5 4 where common shareholders were
cashed out in a merger while preferred shareholders were locked in.
Additionally, the decision may be designed to benefit one shareholder
at the expense of other shareholders, as shown through the payment
of excessively modest dividends in Ford Motor which dried up the
source of financing for a competing business; or, it may provide direc-
tors and officers with an advantage perpetuating their offices at the
expense of shareholders as did the advancement of the annual meet-
ing date in Schnell v. Chris-Craft Industries.m
Intermediate class decisions necessarily include the approval of the
fundamental change transactions,5 6 and may also include other trans-
actions not involving certain tainted motives.57 These transactions,
however, can involve a change in the collaborative agreement, and
this change may be accomplished despite a shareholder's objection.
Those shareholders and directors who approve of a change in the col-
laborative agreement further their self-interest, just as those who ob-
ject to a change further their own self-interest. Those who approve
the change in the collaborative agreement do so because it benefits
them at the expense of those who object. Intercollaborator conflicts
thus rest at the core of decisions approving such transactions.
One final comment about the nature of intermediate actions: Chal-
lenges to them often may be brought as direct actions rather than de-
rivative. And, it is possible that the transaction may be in the best
interests of the corporation. For example, the merger in Van
Gorkom may well have been in the best interests of the corporation
given the tax problem that motivated the merger.58
54. 490 A.2d 574 (Del. Ch.), off'd, 501 A.2d 1238 (Del. 1985).
55. 285 A.2d 437, 439 (Del. Ch. 1971).
56. Fundamental change transactions include amendments to the articles of incor-
poration, mergers, consolidations, share exchanges, sales of substantially all of the cor-
poration's assets, dissolution, and revocation of dissolution. These transactions are
adjacent to self-dealing transactions on the decision spectrum, and are classified as in-
termediate class transactions in this article because they do not necessarily include
self-dealing; although state corporation codes provide some of the same process safe-
guards prescribed for self-dealing transactions. For example, corporation codes nor-
mally require the submission of these transactions to shareholders for a vote, approval
by a majority of all shareholders rather than by the majority of a quorum, and the
right of dissenting shareholders to receive the fair value of their shares. See generally
MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT §§ 11.01-14.40 (1984 & Supp. 1989).
57. See Eisenberg, The Legal Roles of Shareholders and Management in Modern
Corporate Decisionmaking, 57 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 27-33 (1969). The Van Gorkom case
provides an example of an intermediate class decision in which tainted motives do not
appear on the surface. See Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
58. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 864-65. The corporation enjoyed too many tax
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III. THE PROCESS SPECTRUM
A spectrum of decision-making processes corresponds with the de-
cision spectrum. Corporation codes prescribe a baseline process, con-
sisting of meetings and voting, for all board decision-making.59 As a
practical matter, corporate decision-making culminates in the base-
line formalities; actual decision-making frequently encompasses
processes other than meetings and votings. The decision spectrum
discussed here focuses on those decision-making processes beyond the
baseline process. The case and statutory law reveal a bipolar spec-
trum that includes a large intermediate class of processes. The poles
are represented by the individualized process required under the
duty of care and the collective process required when the duty of loy-
alty is at stake. The intermediate class of processes contains ele-
ments of both.
A. Process Under the Duty of Care
The corporate law of most states, whether by statute or common
law, imposes a fiduciary duty of care on directors in the exercise of
their business judgment. The duty of care as normally formulated by
statute or case law requires good faith, the use of the skill, care and
diligence of an ordinarily prudent person under similar circum-
stances, and attempts to further what a director believes to be the
best interests of the corporation.60 The duty of care is imposed on
each individual director. The business judgment rule defense
presumes that directors have satisfied their duty of care, both in se-
lecting processes and in the making of substantive decisions.
The presumption that directors have satisfied the duty of care does
not mean they may freely breach their duty of care without conse-
quence. The business judgment rule defense does not protect direc-
tors who breach their duty of care.6 1 At a minimum, the duty of care
requires directors to use adequate process in performing their duties.
Each director individually should reach a decision on board matters
through processes that a director acting in good faith as an ordinarily
prudent person trying to further the best interests of the corporation
breaks. The nature of its business yielded investment tax credits which were meaning-
less because its depreciation cost recovery effectively reduced any tax liability against
which the credits could be used.
59. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8 (1984 & Supp. 1988); MODEL BUSINESS CORP.
AcT §§ 8.20-.25 (Supp. 1989).
60. MODEL BUSINESS CORP. ACT § 8.30(a) (Supp. 1989).
61. Arsht, supra note 2, at 118-20.
would use. A director may be subject to personal liability for the fail-
ure to use appropriate process to fulfill the duty of care.6 2 Where the
validity of the decision is concerned, however, the group process or
the sum of the individual processes are important. Ordinarily, the
corporation cannot suffer harm from a breach of the duty of care un-
less a majority of the directors breached that duty.
Perhaps the most important element of the duty is the obligation
to become informed about the business and financial affairs of the
corporation, and about the circumstances of a particular action or de-
cision.63 The business judgment rule defense will not be available
unless a director was adequately informed of the relevant circum-
stances.6 4 However, directors possess wide discretion in determining
the manner in which they become informed.
Such discretion is implicit in the grant of authority to take action
and make decisions within their business judgment. The statutory
grants of power usually do not prescribe specific decision-making
processes. Most statutes expressly recognize that directors, especially
outside directors, will have to rely on officers, other employees, and
professionals for information on which to base their decisions.65 Stat-
utes today are designed to relax any judicial requirements that direc-
tors must become experts themselves on every aspect of the
corporation's business. Reliance on delegatees in decision-making
processes will not be required, but will be permitted.
B. Process Under the Duty of Loyalty
The discretion of directors to select the processes by which they
consider transactions between the corporation and interested direc-
tors is limited by case and statutory law. Historically, such transac-
tions were per se void as violations of the duty of loyalty.66 Under
current law, such transactions are voidable unless they are intrinsi-
cally fair to the corporation. The Delaware Supreme Court has noted
that fairness has two components: fair course of dealing and fair
price.67 The latter component is a substantive constraint on the
62. Many jurisdictions have enacted statutes which permit shareholders to adopt
or amend articles of incorporation to eliminate the personal liability of directors to
shareholders or the corporation for the breach of the duty of care. Steinberg, The
Eviscertion of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919, 920, n.12 (1988).
63. Francis v. United Jersey Bank, 87 N.J. 15, 432 A.2d 814 (1981) (a director
should become familiar with the fundamentals of the transactions in which the corpo-
ration is involved).
64. Arsht, supra note 2, at 111-12, 119-20.
65. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 141(e) (Supp. 1988); MODEL BuSINESS CORP.
ACT § 8.30(b) (Supp. 1989).
66. R. Clark, supra note 10, at § 5.1.
67. Weinberger v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 711 (Del. 1983).
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terms of the transaction that may be approved by the directors,6"
while the former examines the process by which the transaction was
approved. A fair course of dealing requires good faith and full disclo-
sure of both the conflict of interest and material terms of the trans-
action to shareholders or disinterested directors who must vote to
approve the transaction.69 It will include a wide range of acceptable
processes. 70 Statutes applicable to such transactions require fairness,
as well as disclosure to, and approval by, disinterested directors or
shareholders.7 1 Good faith within fair dealing requires the directors
to act with proper motives and in the best interests of the
corporation.
The applicable statutes often prescribe the range of process in the
disjunctive. For example, the utilization of one, but not all, of the
given processes is properly within the literal language of the statu-
tory requirements. 72 It might appear that compliance with the disin-
terested director or shareholder vote would obviate the need for the
transaction to pass the fairness test. But such is not the case.73 How-
ever, under Delaware law, "an informed vote of the majority of the
minority shareholders" will shift the burden of proof on the issue of
fairness to complaining shareholders. 74 If the transaction is approved
through a sound and honest process that will give shareholders and
courts confidence that an error was not likely to result, the transac-
tion is presumed to be fair.
Unlike the processes permitted at the other pole, the concern here
68. Fair price embraces "the economic and financial considerations .. . including
all relevant factors: assets, market value, earnings, future prospects, and any other el-
ements that affect the intrinsic or inherent value of a company's stock." Id,
69. Id.
70. In Weinberger, the court stated that fair dealing encompasses "questions of
when the transaction was timed, how it was initiated, structured, negotiated, disclosed
to the directors, and how the approvals of the directors and stockholders were ob-
tained." Id
71. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 144 (1984).
72. Delaware law provides that no conflict of interest transaction shall be void or
voidable solely because of the conflict "if: (1) ... or (2) . .. or (3) The contract or trans-
action is fair as to the corporation as of the time it is authorized, approved or ratified,
by the board of directors." Id. at § 144(a).
73. In Fliegler v. Lawrence, 361 A.2d 218, 221-22 (Del. 1976), the Delaware
Supreme Court held that section 145 of the Delaware Corporations Code does not
sanction unfairness. Accord, Marciano v. Nakash, 535 A.2d 400 (Del. 1987). However,
in Rosenblatt v. Getty Oil Co., 493 A.2d 929 (Del. 1985), the Delaware Supreme Court
held that the use of the procedure set forth in Delaware Corporations Code section
144(a)(2)--disclosure to, and approval by, shareholders-shifts the burden of proving
unfairness to the complaining shareholder. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937.
74. Rosenblatt, 493 A.2d at 937.
shifts from the individual process to the collective process. The in-
tegrity of decision-making that involves the duty of loyalty rests on
the substance of the transaction, and the process by which the board
approved it, rather than on the process used by individual directors
in deciding how to vote.
C. Intermediate Process and the Duty of Fair Dealing
Directors owe shareholders a duty of fair dealing.75 They may not
favor certain shareholders over others except as permitted in the ar-
ticles of incorporation. 76 Controlling shareholders also owe minority
shareholders a fiduciary duty of fair dealing. Directors are supposed
to perform their work for the benefit of shareholders and not for
themselves. These rules directly address the potential for injury to
minority shareholders due to intercollaborator conflicts of interest.
When deciding cases in which these conflicts appear, the courts,
while expressing concern, have not provided consistent analyses of
applicable rules. Courts will often categorize these cases as duty of
care, business judgment rule, or duty of loyalty problems. Courts
have been more consistent when addressing the fiduciary duty of
controlling shareholders, but frequently it is not clear whether the
duty of fair dealing is an independent duty or whether it is part of
the duty of loyalty.
Even if the applicable rules are not clear, the general underlying
themes reflected in these cases have been remarkably consistent. A
major theme holds that the business judgment rule should not shield
actions or decisions that may result from the taint of an intercol-
laborator conflict rather than the exercise of independent business
judgment. In Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co.,77 the Delaware
Supreme Court examined an "inherent conflict" that was the "omni-
present specter that a board may be acting primarily in its own inter-
ests, rather than those of the corporation and its shareholders."7 8
Where such conflicts are present, the courts express a need to police
such actions and decisions with greater scrutiny. The Unocal court
noted that "there is an enhanced duty which calls for judicial exami-
nation at the threshold before the protections of the business judg-
ment rule may be conferred." 79
The inherent conflict between directors and shareholders is also
75. Dalton v. American Inv. Co., 490 A.2d 574, 579 (Del. Ch.), aff'd, 501 A.2d 1238
(Del. 1985).
76. Dalton, 490 A.2d at 583-85; see also Speed v. Transamerica Corp., 235 F.2d 369,
373-74 (3d Cir. 1956).
77. 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985).
78. Id. at 954.
79. Id,
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raised in cases such as Burks v. LaskersO and Zapata Corp. v. Maldo-
nado,81 wherein committees of disinterested directors recommended
the dismissal of derivative suits. In Zapata, the court framed the is-
sue in terms of "whether the board, tainted by the self-interest of a
majority of its members, can legally delegate its authority to a com-
mittee of two disinterested directors."8 2 Again, the Delaware
Supreme Court imposed a larger policing role for the courts. If a
lower court determines that the committee used proper process, the
Zapata court noted that it should then evaluate the committee's rec-
ommendation to dismiss the derivative action by substituting its own
business judgment for that of the committee.8 3
In executing this larger policing role, the courts have extended the
individualized process requirements of the duty of care and borrowed
elements of the collective process required under the duty of loyalty
to produce a hybrid, intermediate class of process. Intermediate pro-
cess, as thus developed, includes the use of one or more of the follow-
ing: a reasonable investigation, independent or disinterested
directors, expert advice, disclosure to shareholders, and substantive
constraints on the action or decision. It should be noted that these
requirements are not necessarily new ideas of the judiciary.
The obligation of individual directors to become informed re-
mainss4 but, implicitly, the duty to conduct a reasonable investigation
is imposed on the collective board of directors in addition to individ-
ual directors. In Cheff v. Mathes,8 5 two directors undertook personal
investigations of the reputation of a potential buyer of the corpora-
tion and reported their results to the other directors. The Cheff
court imputed the investigations to the full board.86 Where a reason-
able investigation is necessary, if individual directors are to fulfill
80. 441 U.S. 471 (1979).
81. 430 A.2d 779 (Del. 1981).
82. Id. at 786.
83. Id. at 789. For a proposed statutory response to Zapata and its progeny, see
AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE: ANALYSIS AND
RECOMMENDATIONS § 7.08-.11 (Tentative Draft No. 9, Apr. 14, 1989) (as modified at the
1989 ALI Annual Meeting) (specifically contemplates judicial review as a part of cor-
porate decision-making) and § 7.44 (proposed), printed in Committee on Corporate
Laws, thanges in the Model Business Corporation Act-Amendments Pertaining to
Derivative Proceedings, 44 Bus. LAW. 543 (1989) (enhances process requirements but
retains role for traditional business judgment rule defense).
84. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 873-75 (Del. 1985).
85. 199 A.2d 548 (Del. 1964).
86. Id. at 556.
their obligations to become informed, the investigation should be con-
ducted by or under the auspices of the full board.
The group obligation to conduct a reasonable investigation is fur-
ther supported by other elements of intermediate process, such as the
use of independent directors and experts. For example, it is now
common practice to delegate the conduct of an investigation and the
decision of whether to seek the dismissal of a derivative suit to a
committee of disinterested directors.87 The conducting of an investi-
gation by an independent committee is crucial to a motion to dismiss
a derivative suit.8 8 Some courts have also recognized the reliance of a
committee on experts.8 9 Courts frequently look for the use of finan-
cial experts when boards consider the sale of the corporation and
when boards determine defensive actions necessary to repel hostile
takeovers.90
Requiring the use of disinterested directors is based on the premise
that they, by virtue of their disinterest, are more likely to conduct
reasonable investigations than those tainted with an interest. Fur-
ther, disinterested directors are more likely to rely on the results of
that investigation. Experts are required because of their ability to
view matters objectively and accurately, and to render professional
opinions about legality and value. For example, directors who are
buying assets from a corporation may be capable of valuing the assets
correctly, but will also be susceptible to the human inclination of a
buyer to value the assets as low as possible. A financial analyst will
seek to ascertain an accurate value, whether higher or lower than the
value seen by the directors.
In some instances, the entire board may act rather than delegate
the decision to a committee of disinterested directors. Here, inquiries
will be directed toward the entire board and the process it used to
assure that it reached an independent business judgment.91 How-
ever, where the taint of the intercollaborator conflict of interest is
unavoidable, an independent business judgment necessitates a greater
role for outside directors. An action of the board is more likely to be
viewed as the product of an independent business judgment where
disinterested directors have played pivotal roles.92
Substantive constraints that limit the permissible terms of a trans-
action constitute the most controversial component of intermediate
87. R. Clark, supra note 10, at § 15.2.
88. See generally Aronson v. Lewis, 473 A.2d 805, 812-16 (Del. 1984).
89. Auerbach v. Bennett, 47 N.Y.2d 619, 393 N.E.2d 994, 419 N.Y.S.2d 920 (1980).
90. Hanson Trust PLC v. ML SCM Acquisition, Inc., 781 F.2d 264 (2d Cir. 1986);
see also Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946 (Del. 1985); Smith v. Van
Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858 (Del. 1985).
91. Aronson, 473 A.2d at 814-16.
92. Unocal, 493 A.2d at 955.
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process, for such constraints demonstrate judicial second-guessing.
When the business judgment rule defense is applicable, its very es-
sence precludes an evaluation of the merits of a board decision or ac-
tion. Smith v. Van Gorkom was surprising because the court
transcended traditional boundaries when it determined that a sub-
stantial gain produced by a decision was not enough. Attorney Arsht
had acknowledged prior to Van Gorkom that the business judgment
rule defense does not preclude judicial merit evaluation where direc-
tors have not fulfilled their individualized process obligations under
the duty of care.93
The duty of fair dealing applies generally to conflicts among con-
trolling and minority shareholders. As the nomenclature suggests,
decisions involving this conflict are subject to the constraint of fair-
ness. In the freeze-out merger context, some jurisdictions also add
the requirement that the merger have a business purpose other than
the elimination of minority shareholders. 94 Fairness constraints,
however, do not generate the heart of the controversy. More impor-
tant problems arise where the courts attempt to impose substantive
constraints other than fairness. Although the court articulated a sub-
stantive constraint on dividend policy in Dodge v. Ford Motor Co.,95
the standard advanced by the court shed little light on how to com-
pute the amount of a dividend in future cases.
The difficulty with substantive constraints lies in the inherent
premise that there are some decisions or actions which should or
should not be made. How are directors, who must take action or
make decisions without a perfect view of the future, to know what
those actions or decisions are? If courts know which decisions should
and should not be made, how do they inform directors without sub-
stituting board decisions with judicial intervention? The result has
been a hotchpot of somewhat vague common law standards devel-
oped as courts have reviewed cases that appeared ripe for substantive
constraints.
Van Gorkom holds, to the extent it articulates a constraint, that di-
rectors must actively seek to maximize shareholder return when
93. Arsht, supra note 2, at 111.
94. Delaware embraced the business purpose doctrine in Singer v. Magnavox, 380
A.2d 969 (Del. 1977), and subsequent cases, but decisively abandoned it in Weinberger
v. UOP, Inc., 457 A.2d 701, 715 (Del. 1985). The doctrine still lives in other jurisdic-
tions, See Coggins v. New England Patriots Football Club, 397 Mass. 525, 492 N.E.2d
1112 (1986); Alpert v. 28 Williams St. Corp., 63 N.Y.2d 557, 473 N.E.2d 19, 483 N.Y.S.2d
667 (1984).
95. See supra notes 50-52 and accompanying text.
they approve a sale of the corporation. This constraint is not incon-
sistent with the general profit-making motive and risk-taking. The
judicial treatment of motions to dismiss derivative suits authorized by
committees of disinterested directors perhaps better epitomizes the
hotchpot. Zapata, for example, has been criticized for its imposition
of substantive constraints on the decision of a committee of directors
to seek dismissal of a derivative suit.96 The major flaw is not so
much the interference with the business judgment rule defense, but
the failure to articulate the principle upon which director decisions
will be evaluated. 97 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, mindful of
the criticism of Zapata, advanced this standard in Joy v. North:98 A
court should dismiss a derivative action if the costs of continuing it
outweigh the probable gain from doing so. 99
Intercollaborator conflicts among directors and shareholders pro-
vide fertile ground for substantive constraints, but the duty of fair
dealing and fairness constraints are less meaningful. For example,
the compensation of incumbent executives may be extravagant by so-
cietal norms and seem unfair to many, but if the compensation is
comparable to what a corporation would have to pay in the market
for corporate executives, general perceptions of fairness are not par-
ticularly useful. In fact, the substantive constraint on such compen-
sation boils down to whether the compensation bears a reasonable
relationship to the services rendered.OO
Takeover defenses have produced several attempts to formulate
substantive constraints. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. limited
the defensive actions that a board of directors can utilize to those
"reasonably related to the threat posed."'' Other cases require di-
rectors to take actions that advance the cause of shareholder
wealth.102 The court in Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Hold-
ings, Inc. 103 required directors to conduct an auction whenever "it be-
came apparent to all that the break-up of the company was
inevitable." 104 That constraint has been expandedl05 and, as fre-
96. Dean Clark evaluated the criticisms of Zapata and argued that this failure is
not a major flaw because courts engage in the same evaluation of the substantive mer-
its of director decisions when they examine self-dealing decisions. R. Clark, supra
note 10, at § 15.2.
97. Block & Prussin, The Business Judgment Rule and Shareholder Derivative Ac-
tions: Viva Zapata?, 37 Bus. LAw. 27 (1981).
98. 692 F.2d 880 (2d Cir. 1982), cert denied, 460 U.S. 1051 (1983).
99. Id. at 892.
100. Rogers v. Hill, 289 U.S. 582 (1933). Some cases do suggest that executive com-
pensation can be measured by the intrinsic fairness standard. See, e.g., Mitchelson v.
Duncan, 407 A.2d 211 (Del. 1979).
101. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 955 (Del. 1985).
102. See, e.g., Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705 (7th Cir. 1986).
103. 506 A.2d 173 (Del. 1986).
104. id. at 182.
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quently occurs with such constraints, has also been watered down.106
Additionally, directors may approve lock-up options where they seek
to stimulate bidding, but not where it precludes bidding.107
Contests for voting control of a corporation also produce attempts
to impose substantive constraints. The Delaware courts have shown
a heightened sensitivity to cases where an incumbent board of direc-
tors either changes the rules of the shareholder electoral process or
takes some other action to avert a victory by one or more sharehold-
ers. In Schnell v. Chris-Craft Indus.,108 a board of directors, facing a
contested election, advanced the election date to shorten the cam-
paign period for the nonincumbent candidates. Although this action
was expressly permitted by statute, the court rejected it, holding that
directors may not take action which is inequitable.1o 9
IV. SUBSTANTIVE CONSTRAINTS AND INTEGRITY OF PROCESS
Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co. implied a direct relationship
between the strength of intercollaborator conflicts and the likelihood
that a decision is not the product of business judgment. The en-
hanced duty referred to by the Unocal court means that a board must
take steps to assure all concerned parties that the decision was in-
deed the product of business judgment. The approach of the court in-
dicates that such assurance is obtainable through integrity of process.
The proposition is a simple one: the greater the degree of integrity in
the decision-making process, the greater the probability that the deci-
sion resulted from the exercise of business judgment. Additionally, a
board must do more to show integrity in intermediate class decisions
than in the case of decisions on ordinary matters. Smith v. Van
Gorkom echoes the Unocal analysis. The Van Gorkom board failed
to take adequate steps to assure that the decision was produced
through business judgment.
However, integrity of process does not seem to explain the applica-
tion of substantive constraints by the courts to intermediate class de-
105. See infra note 122 and accompanying text.
106. See In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litigation, [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94, 514 (Del. Ch. July 14, 1989).
107. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182-84.
108. 285 A.2d 430 (Del. Ch. 1971).
109. Id. at 439. The inequitable purpose of the directors was the perpetuation of
themselves in office. Id Professor Branson has called the Schnell inequitable action
doctrine a "wild card" rule, and traces its application in election, freeze-out merger
and takeover cases. Branson, The Chancellor's Foot in Delaware: Schnell and its Prog-
eny, 14 J. CoRP. L. 515 (1989).
cisions. If a board utilizes measures to assure integrity of process and
the exercise of business judgment, why are substantive constraints
necessary? Two reasons may be forwarded. First, substantive con-
straints establish the standards against which decisions produced
through deficient process are evaluated. This rationale explains the
Van Gorkom conclusion that the board caused injury to the com-
plaining shareholders because the actual value of the corporation was
greater than the amount obtained by the board of directors.11o
Second, notwithstanding the integrity of the process used by a
board of directors,"'1 there are some decisions which, in the exercise
of business judgment, should or should not be made under the cir-
cumstances. Litwin v. Allen, although generally recognized as an ab-
erration to the business judgment rule defense,11 2 demonstrates this
justification. Perhaps the court reached the result in Litwin because
it was really an intermediate class decision. That is, the decision may
have been tainted by the influence of intercollaborator conflicts.
Dean Clark indicates that the opinion implies that the court noted
the influence even though the plaintiff could not prove it.113 The
court may have found negligence on the part of the directors because
it believed the decision was one that directors exercising business
110. Smith v. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d 858, 874-78 (Del. 1985). The court appeared to
give short shrift to the element of causation. It remanded the case to the Court of
Chancery to conduct a fair value proceeding in accordance with Weinberger v. UOP
and assess damages. Van Gorkom, 488 A.2d at 893. Presumably, if the fair value were
higher than the price obtained by the directors, the complaining shareholders would
have been deemed harmed by the deficient process.
111. The court in Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado expressed reservations that a board
could ever attain true independence where directors are the subject of a derivative
suit:
[W]e must be mindful that directors are passing judgment on fellow directors
in the same corporation and fellow directors, in this instance, who designated
them to serve both as directors and committee members. The question natu-
rally arises whether a "there but for the grace of God go I" empathy might
not play a role. And the further question arises whether inquiry as to inde-
pendence, good faith and reasonable investigation is sufficient safeguard
against abuse, perhaps subconscious abuse.
Zapata, 430 A.2d at 787. Similar reservations are reflected in the two-prong test
adopted in Aronson, which examines director independence and business judgment
separately. See supra note 46.
112. The case in many ways resembles an intermediate class case. Some banking
transactions, by their very nature, raise concerns similar to those about intercol-
laborator conflicts. Professors Cary and Eisenberg argue that certain financial transac-
tions possess three unique characteristics that may warrant more stringent standards:
(1) a corporation that regularly receives cash from a class of persons who have a spe-
cial relationship with the corporation other than that of debtor-creditor; (2) the temp-
tations that accompany the handling of large amounts of liquid cash; and (3)
obligations imposed by specific statutes. Cary & Eisenberg, supra note 13, at 516-17.
Thus, the directors of financial institutions may have a duty, solely because of the na-
ture of the business it conducts, to undertake measures to assure that a decision results
from the exercise of business judgment.
113. R. Clark, supra note 10, at § 3.4
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judgment would not have made. 114 The business judgment rule de-
fense was not applicable, although many scholars have argued that it
should have been, because the directors had not, in light of the lurk-
ing intercollaborator conflict, assured the court that the decision re-
sulted from business judgment.
Takeover cases provide other examples of the second justification
for substantive constraints. Unocal, in essence, holds that directors
acting within their business judgment would not choose a takeover
defense which is not reasonably related to the threat posed. Dynam-
ics Corp. v. CTS Corp. ,115 a case involving an Indiana corporation, ad-
hered to the Unocal standard and articulated a similar concept.
Directors acting within their business judgment would not select a
takeover defense which was adverse to the maximization of share-
holder wealth. The court in Unocal upheld a decision to use a self-
tender offer while the Dynamics court upheld a decision to adopt a
poison pill. In Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc.,
the court applied the Unocal standard to invalidate decisions to ap-
prove a lock-up option and no-shop provision to terminate bidding
during the course of an option.116
Assuming that the second justification is correct, the judicial pro-
mulgation of substantive constraints presumes that courts are suited
to determine which decisions should and should not be made, and
that business decisions involving varying degrees of risk are suitable
for evaluation against such constraints. Experience with the judicial
adoption of substantive constraints raises a question about whether
courts are the appropriate institutions for deriving substantive con-
straints for risk-taking decisions, rather than other institutions like
boards of directors. Sooner or later, a final decision must rest with
some imperfect human agency, and courts are not yet perfect
institutions.
For example, the court may have done the right thing in Litwin,
but its use of negligence as a substantive constraint did not illuminate
the parameters of the constraint. Unfortunately, the methodology of
the Litwin court occurs all too often in intermediate class decision
114. Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 886 (2d Cir. 1982), characterized Litwin as a no-win
decision. The court described the transaction as one from which the corporation had
no upside but incurred all of the downside risk. According to the Joy characterization,
directors should not approve such transactions.
115. Dynamics Corp. v. CTS Corp., 805 F.2d 705, 708 (7th Cir. 1986).
116. Revlon, Inc. v. MacAndrews & Forbes Holdings, Inc., 506 A.2d 182-84 (Del.
1986); cf. Cottle v. Storer Communication, Inc., 849 F.2d 570 (11th Cir. 1988).
cases. Courts institute the required scrutiny and evaluation of the
merits, and then pronounce lofty but vague constraints which provide
little guidance to directors and the corporate bar about future trans-
actions.117 The substantive constraints must be refined, ignored, or
retracted on a case-by-case basis. The Delaware experience with the
duty to conduct an auction in takeover cases provides an example of
this approach.
In Revlon, the Delaware Supreme Court imposed a duty to auction
once it became clear that a break-up of the corporation was inevita-
ble.118 The Delaware courts have attempted to refine the contours of
this substantive constraint in several subsequent auction cases. 119
The Delaware courts have also addressed such questions as: what
constitutes a break-up or a sale of the corporation,120 and, what is an
auction?121
However, in In re Time Inc. Shareholders Litigation, 22 the Dela-
ware Chancery court pointed out the limits of the duty to auction as
a substantive constraint. The duty to auction was not considered the
kind of constraint on the particular terms and conditions where a
court might evaluate the approval of transaction and say that direc-
tors exercising business judgment should not have sold the corpora-
tion on those particular terms and conditions.123 Instead, the
constraint is one that requires the directors to proceed in a specific
way to maximize the return to shareholders, 24 but only in those cir-
cumstances in which directors exercising their business judgment
would decide that the auction is the most reliable means of obtaining
maximum value. The court designated those circumstances as the
"Revlon mode."125 And, according to the court, the Revlon mode was
117. See Macey and Miller, supra note 19, at 131-32.
118. Revlon, 506 A.2d at 182.
119. See Black & Decker Corp. v. American Standard, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 772 (D.
Del. 1988); Mills Acquisition Co. v. MacMillan, Inc., 559 A.2d 1261 (Del. 1989); In re
J.P. Stevens & Co., Inc. Shareholder Litigation, 542 A.2d 770 (Del. Ch. 1988); Citron v.
Fairchild Camera and Instrument Corp., (1988-89 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep.
(CCH) 93,915 (Del. Ch. May 19, 1988); In re RJR Nabisco, Inc. Shareholders Litigation,
[1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,194 (Del. Ch. as amended Feb.
14, 1989).
120. See, e.g., Freedman v. Restaurant Assoc. Indus., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed.
Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,502 (Del. Ch. Oct. 16, 1987) (the duty to conduct an auction
arose upon any change in control of the corporation); Ivanhoe v. Newmont Mining
Corp., [1987-88 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 93,503 (Del. Ch. Oct. 15,
1987) (the duty to auction arises when it becomes inevitable that the corporation will
be sold to one of the competing bidders).
121. See Mills, 559 A.2d 1261; In re J.P. Stevens & Co., 542 A.2d 770; In re RJR
Nabisco, 94,194.
122. [1989-90 Transfer Binder] Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 94,514 (Del. Ch. July 14,
1989).
123. Time, at 93,276.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 93,277.
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not triggered by the transaction at issue in In re Time. 26
Even though the Revlon mode may not have been triggered, the
case did involve an intermediate class decision to which the court ap-
plied the Unocal standard.127 The court treated the recasting of the
transaction as a defensive measure to which Unocal was applicable,
but found that the measure was reasonable in relation to the threat
imposed.128 The court ultimately held that the approval of the
merger and rebuff of the Paramount bid was protected by the busi-
ness judgment rule defense.129 The Time board had taken sufficient
steps to assure integrity of process so that its decision could reason-
ably be said to result from business judgment.
Parallel experiences occur in Delaware with the development of
the business purpose rule130 and the Schnell inequitable action
rule.131 In each instance, the courts articulated imperfect substantive
constraints which were not capable of providing guidance for future
compliance in all cases. The issuance of the constraints invited addi-
tional litigation, as well as announced the willingness of the judiciary
to use its limited resources to police director decisions. Moreover, the
substantive constraints were placed on top of enhanced process re-
quirements. If such constraints provide less certainty to directors
and increase the drain on judicial resources, why do courts resort to
them?
Unocal provides a hint in its enhanced duty language. "[T]here is
an enhanced duty which calls for judicial examination at the thresh-
old before the protections of the business judgment rule may be con-
126. Id.
127. The case started as a merger between Time Inc. (Time) and Warner Commu-
nications, Inc. (Warner). After Paramount Communications, Inc. (Paramount)
launched a cash tender offer for shares of Time, the merger was recast as a cash
tender offer by Time for shares of Warner. The directors of Time unashamedly con-
fessed their motivation, in negotiating the consolidation of the Time and Warner enter-
prises, to assure that they remained in control of the merged enterprise, albeit that the
motivation was supported by business objectives. A recurring theme of the directors
was the necessity of preserving the editorial independence of Time publications. Time,
94,515, at 93,268-69.
128. Id. at 93,281-84.
129. Id. at 93,284.
130. See supra note 95. Professors Gilson and Kraakman allude to the history of
the development of the business purpose standard in Delaware in their discussion of
the outlook for judicial development of the Unocal reasonable relationship standard.
Gilson and Kraakman, Delaware's Intermediate Standard for Defensive Tactics: Is
There Substance to Proportionality Review?, 44 Bus. LAW. 247, 251 (1989).
131. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. For an interesting history of
the Schnell doctrine, see Branson, supra note 110.
ferred."132 Clearly, the court believed that judicial inclusion is a part
of the process. The court pronounced the reasonable relationship
standard as one to be applied at the threshold. 33 Thus, the standard
is one that tests for business judgment, but it is the court that will
apply the test. One may conclude that this particular substantive
constraint was not formulated because it removes the judicial system
from the corporate decision-making process, but because it actually
injects the courts into the process.
Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado articulated similar concerns. The court
addressed the issue of the drain of judicial resources and found the
concern not compelling. 3 4 It also considered "the danger of judicial
overreaching" but found "the alternatives . . . outweighed by the
fresh view of a judicial outsider."'135 What advantages does the judici-
ary provide that favor its inclusion in corporate decision-making?
Could it be that injecting the courts into corporate decision-making
adds the ultimate element to integrity of process? It brings to corpo-
rate decision-making an institution subject to a high degree of ac-
countability, imbued with impeccable integrity.
Perhaps the courts are concerned that intercollaborator conflicts
left unchecked would shake investor confidence in the markets. Af-
ter all, the existence of intercollaborator conflicts is well-known, and
Schnell and a host of other cases demonstrate the capacity of direc-
tors and officers to rigidly follow any procedural process require-
ments.136 The investing public may remain skeptical about the
approval of a transaction even though the decision-making process is
sound. If a court upholds the decision on the basis that the process
was sound, the public may conclude that wrongdoing was protected
by a technicality. But if the court examines the substance of the de-
cision and approves it, the decision may be more readily accepted.
Whether it is wise for courts to place their institutional power on the
line in these cases is left for another article.
Even if courts are suited to divine substantive constraints, possess
special competencies to evaluate substantive decisions, as suggested
by Zapata, 37 and analyze the flaws of corporate decision-making,
132. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
133. Id at 955.
134. Zapata Corp. v. Maldonado, 430 A.2d 779, 788 (Del. 1981).
135. Id
136. The Delaware court expressly acknowledged this concern in Zapata. "The sec-
ond step [application of the court's own business judgment] is intended to thwart in-
stances where corporate actions meet the criteria of step one, but the result does not
appear to satisfy its spirit .... Id. at 789.
137. The court in Zapata stated:
In pursuit of the course, we recognize that "[the final substantive judgment
whether a particular lawsuit should be maintained requires a balance of many
factors--ethical, commercial, promotional, public relations, employee rela-
tions, fiscal as well as legal".... But we are content that such factors are not
[Vol. 17: 879, 1990] Decisional Integrity
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
courts will still not be able to articulate constraints that neatly apply
to all risk-taking decisions. The essence of the business judgment
rule defense recognizes the existence of many possible correct
courses of action in any given situation. It is not possible to devise or
construct a rule that will tell directors which course of action is per-
missible in every case. Of course, substantive constraints necessarily
will be applied where the directors have used a deficient process.
But when will courts attempt to apply substantive constraints and
engage in an evaluation of the merits of director decisions other than
in self-dealing cases? Courts are most likely to resort to substantive
constraints in cases involving intermediate class decisions, in which
the intercollaborator conflict rises to the level of an "omnipresent
specter."ss As Unocal and other cases indicate, courts are most
likely to impose constraints whenever they perceive that a decision
has the capacity or undue influence by intercollaborator conflicts,
notwithstanding the use of acceptable process.
Consistent with the history of judicial reluctance to order affirma-
tive acts, courts are more likely to try substantive constraints in the
case of decisions that should not be made in the exercise of business
judgment than those decisions that should. Revlon, Schnell, and Uno-
cal all involved standards for determining whether a decision should
not have been made. Van Gorkom stands as an aberration, and per-
haps means only that courts will look at decisions that ought to be
made only where the question of damages arises due to the use of de-
fective process or other failure to exercise business judgment.
V. CONCLUSION
This article has relied heavily on Delaware case law because of the
myriad of available case history. However, the author's intent is not
to suggest that the Delaware experience has occurred in all jurisdic-
tions. Instead, this article suggests that courts in other jurisdictions
also grapple with these issues, face similar concerns, and frequently
follow the Delaware courts. Accordingly, this article rests on the
premise that the Delaware courts do provide some basis for extrapo-
lating the general attitudes and perspectives of courts regarding these
matters.
"beyond the judicial reach" of the Court of Chancery which regularly and
competently deals with fiduciary relationships, disposition of trust property,
approval of settlements and scores of similar problems.
I& at 788 (quoting Maldonado v. Flynn, 485 F. Supp. 274, 285 (S.D.N.Y. 1980)).
138. Unocal Corp. v. Mesa Petroleum Co., 493 A.2d 946, 954 (Del. 1985).
Whether courts seek integrity of process or the exercise of business
judgment where intermediate class decisions are concerned, it cannot
remove the risk from profit-making decisions. Courts should take
great care in articulating substantive constraints added to enhanced
process duties, for injecting themselves into corporate decision-mak-
ing processes places societal respect for the judiciary at stake. Disap-
pointed and dissenting shareholders may not become any less so
merely because a court has determined that the board of directors
made a legally valid decision. Judicial origination of substantive con-
straints will succeed only if corporate decision-making objectively im-
proves so that there are fewer disappointed and dissenting
shareholders.
However, these cases have a decided equitable influence. Directors
and the corporate bar should not expect less judicial overreaching,
for equity never sleeps. In fact, courts may be even more diligent in
their scrutiny since many jurisdictions now statutorily permit the ab-
rogation of the personal liability of directors for the breach of their
duty of care.13 9 These statutes do not sheild directors in self-dealing
cases and may provide only limited protection in intermediate deci-
sion cases.
139. See Steinberg, The Evisceration of the Duty of Care, 42 Sw. L.J. 919 (1988).
